1 April 1970

	MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR	
25X1 25X1	SUBJECT: The North Laos Support Problem	25 X1
25X1	1. There has been a good deal of confusion in recent days with respect to the US Government's i.e., Vientiane Station's requirements for support in north Laos and the steps taken, in train or theoretically authorized to meet these requirements. This confusion has been compounded within the past 48 hours by MACV's withdrawal of four aircraft temporarily loaned to augment north Laos	
25X1	resources	
ł	sort out the various factors involved, present a comprehensive status	
_	sort out the various factors involved, present a compression and offer certain action recommendations report on the current situation and offer certain action recommendations	
	for your consideration.	25X1
	101 your comman	

MORI/CDF)

25X1

25X1



Approved For Release 2006/1	0/10 : CIA-R	DP80R01720R00	01300030042-5
SECRET		_	

25X1

mission, i.e., prosecution of the war in Vietnam. In our view, the level of resources allocated to north Laos requirements has always been, and remains today, unacceptably low. As one small example

of the prevailing disproportionate imbalance, during the week ending and this proportional allocation is 21 February,


25X1

typical.

During the past ten months, the following steps have been taken

25X1

- 3 -



25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

STAT

Copy No. 7 - C/FI/Copy No. 8 - SAVA

Copy No. 9 - SAVA

25X1

25X1

25X1

9. The intelligence needs, and the Station's critical requirements for are clear. It is equally clear that MACV apparently will not, meet them without a direct order from a very high level. I have struck out, General Cushman has struck out, and was probably out before he ever reached the plate. What now seems necessary is your intervention qua DCI and USIB Chairman with Wheeler, Laird, or the President (via Kissinger). We can discuss the optimum mechanics of such intervention at our 1 April meeting. You may want to hit all three in sequence to eliminate any complaints about going over someone's head on a problem he "would have solved." The problem is not likely to be solved, however, unless or until someone with sufficient clout to make them stick gives direct, discussion-foreclosing orders.
George A. Carver, Jr. Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachments
O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver Distribution Copy No. 1 - DCI w/atts (returned to SAVA for file) Copy No. 2 - DDCI/ER w/o atts Copy No. 3 - DDP w/o atts Copy No. 4 - C/FE w/o atts Copy No. 5 - C/FE/ w/o atts Copy No. 6 - C/FI/ ts